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vi  ABSTRACT 
 
Jorgensen, Zachary D., M.S., University of South Alabama, July 2008. A Multiple 
Instance Learning Strategy for Combating Adversarial Good Word Attacks on Statistical 
Spam Filters. Chair of Committee: Dr. Yan Zhou. 
Statistical spam filters are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. One of the 
more common adversarial attacks, known as the good word attack, thwarts spam filters 
by appending to spam messages sets of “good” words, which are words that are common 
in legitimate email but rare in spam. This thesis describes a multiple instance learning 
strategy for filtering email spam in the context of good word attacks. Unlike its single 
instance counterpart, a multiple instance learning model treats each example of the target 
concept as a set, or bag, of instances. A bag is labeled positive if at least one of its 
instances is positive, and negative if all instances in the bag are negative.  In the task of 
spam filtering, each email message is treated as a bag of instances (sets of words).  A 
message is classified as spam if at least one instance in the corresponding bag is spam, 
and as legitimate if every instance in the bag is legitimate.  We show that a classifier 
using the proposed multiple instance counterattack strategy is more robust to good word 
attacks than its single instance counterpart and other single instance learners commonly 
employed in the spam filtering domain.
vii CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Motivation 
Modern society has come to depend heavily on the Internet for many daily 
activities.  Email, in particular, has become a major method of communication for many 
organizations and individuals around the world.  In fact, the increasing popularity of 
email-ready mobile phones, PDA’s, and Blackberry devices, as well as the increasing 
existence of public WiFi hotspots, has made email a ubiquitous medium for 
communication.  Although email has proven to be an extremely convenient and useful 
tool, it has also proven to be highly susceptible to misuse. The problem of unsolicited 
bulk email, commonly referred to as spam, has become a significant hindrance to the 
effectiveness of email.  In fact, the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group estimated 
that, from June 2006, spam accounted for as much as 80% of world-wide email [19]. 
Among the various techniques that have been proposed to combat the spam 
problem, spam filtering has been in the forefront.  Emails can be classified as either 
legitimate, also known as ham, or spam. Spam filtering involves automated analysis of 
incoming emails to determine their classification.  Emails determined by the filter to be 
ham are passed into the user’s inbox, while those determined to be spam are either 
deleted or redirected to another location for further analysis by the user.   
1 The majority of current spam filters make use of algorithms based on supervised 
learning techniques developed in the field of machine learning.  Such algorithms use 
statistical information about the content of emails, e.g., word frequencies, to 
automatically classify them. A collection of pre-classified emails—a training set—is used 
to build a statistical model by which new emails can be classified. 
As spam filtering techniques advance, spammers are using increasingly 
sophisticated techniques to circumvent this barrier. As a result, the task of spam filtering 
has become an example of adversarial learning, where an adversary—the spammer—is 
actively trying to defeat the spam filter.  If we are to control the growing spam problem, 
we must take into account the adversarial nature of the problem.  
One of the most common techniques used by spammers to evade detection by a 
filter is known as the good word attack [17]. This attack involves appending to spam 
messages sets of “good words” that are common in ham but rare in spam.  The added 
good words effectively compensate for the spammy portion of the message and allow it 
to pass through the spam filter (see Appendix for samples of actual attacked emails). The 
focus of this research is to develop a possible defense strategy to combat this type of 
adversarial attack.              
1.2  Problem Statement  
This work proposes an effective strategy for combating adversarial good word 
attacks on statistical spam filters, since little research exists in the literature on this 
problem.  
2 Existing spam filters are generally based on single instance supervised learning 
techniques, and treat each email message as a whole, making such filters susceptible to 
good word attacks. We present a strategy that considers each email to be a collection of 
separate parts. We classify an email as spam if it contains at least one part that is spam 
and as legitimate if it contains only legitimate parts. In this way, a spam message that has 
had legitimate parts added to it will still be classified as spam. In this thesis we 
implement this strategy using multiple instance learning as a framework and show that 
the result is a spam filter which is more robust to adversarial good word attacks than 
filters based on single instance supervised learning algorithms. 
3 CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
 
This chapter presents definitions and background information related to this 
research.  Section 2.1 introduces a type of machine learning known as single instance 
supervised learning and describes its role in current spam filters. Section 2.2 introduces 
the concept of multiple instance learning, upon which our proposed strategy is based.  
Finally, section 2.3 presents some of the relevant recent work on spam filtering.   
2.1  Single Instance Supervised Learning 
Supervised learning [28] is a machine learning technique commonly used for 
classification problems.  It is often associated with data mining, in which the goal is to 
extract useful patterns from data.  The goal of supervised learning is to learn the target 
concept from a collection of training examples—referred to as instances—where each 
training example is represented as a vector of attributes, and a class. The learned concept 
can be represented in various forms (for example, as a set of classification rules, or as a 
decision tree) and can be used to assign a class label to previously unseen examples, for 
which the class is clearly unknown. The type (generally nominal, numeric, or boolean) 
and number of attributes used to represent the instances depends on the classification 
problem.  
4 Spam filtering can be expressed naturally as a single instance supervised learning 
classification problem. An email is an instance described by an attribute vector, which 
indicates the presence or absence of specific words.  Training set emails also have a 
known class (which can be either ‘spam’ or ‘legitimate’) and must be classified by hand 
to assure they are correct. The learning algorithm uses the training set to build a binary 
classification function that can be used to classify unknown emails [32].  
One of the most common single instance supervised learning algorithms used in 
statistical spam filters is naïve Bayes [25]. Spam filters based on the naïve Bayes 
classifier make use of Baye’s theorem to determine the probability that a given email 
message is spam.  If the calculated probability is above a certain threshold, then the email 
is considered spam.  The probability that an email, represented as an instance  
 where  } , , , { 2 1 n x x x X K = n x x x , , , 2 1 K  are the attribute values of the instance, is spam is 
calculated as: 
}) , , , { Pr(
) Pr( ) | } , , , { Pr(
) | Pr(
2 1
2 1
n
n
x x x X
spam C spam C x x x X
X spam C
K
K
=
= × = =
= =  
where  ) | } , , , { Pr( 2 1 spam C x x x X n = = K  is the probability that the given attribute values 
appear in a spam email,  ) Pr( spam C =  is the probability of any message being spam, and 
 is the probability of the given attribute values appearing in any 
email message.  C in the formula above refers to the class label of the message which can 
be either spam or legitimate. The probability that a particular attribute (word) will appear 
in a spam email message is calculated during the training process, and is stored in a 
database. The probabilities used in the above formula are obtained from that database. 
}) , , , { Pr( 2 1 n x x x X K =
5 2.2  Multiple Instance Learning 
Multiple instance (MI) learning [9] differs from single instance supervised learning 
in that an example is represented by a set, or bag, of instances rather than as just a single 
instance.  The bag is assigned a class label (either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’) based on the 
instances it contains; however, the instances within the bag are never explicitly labeled. 
Classic MI learning assumes that a bag is positive if at least one instance in the bag is 
positive, and negative if all instances are negative (the precise meanings of ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ depend on the application).   Therefore, the goal of multiple instance learning 
is to learn a classification function that accurately maps a given bag to a class.  Formally, 
let   be a set of bags where  } , , , { B 1 m i B B B K K = } , , , { B 2 1 i j i i i X X X K =   is the i
th bag 
and 
i j i i X X X , , , 2 1 K  are the j instances contained in bag  .  Note that the value of j 
may be different for each bag  ; classic MI learning makes no assumption about the 
number of instances in each bag. If  is a training set, then every   also has an 
accurate label   assigned to it.  The training process, using 
as input, yields a binary classification function   that maps a bag of 
unknown class to its proper class. 
i B
i B
B B B ∈ i
} , { negative positive C ci = ∈
B C B B f i → : ) (
Our spam filtering strategy adopts the classical MI assumption, which states that a 
bag is positive if at least one of its instances is positive, and negative if all instances are 
negative. We treat each email as a bag of instances. Thus, an email is classified as spam if 
at least one instance in the corresponding bag is spam, and as legitimate if all the 
instances in it are legitimate. The idea is that by splitting an email into multiple instances, 
a multiple instance learner will be able to recognize the spam part of the message even if 
6 the message has been injected with good words. In this thesis, we show that a multiple 
instance learner, combined with an appropriate technique for splitting emails into 
multiple instance bags, is more robust to good word attacks than its single instance 
counterpart and other single instance learners that are commonly used in the spam 
filtering domain.   
In Chapter 3, we formalize spam filtering as a multiple instance classification 
problem in the context of adversarial attacks.  
2.3  Related Work 
Our work is primarily motivated by recent research on adversarial learning [8], 
[16], [13]. Dalvi et al. consider classification as a game between classifiers and 
adversaries in problem domains where adversarial attacks are expected [8]. They model 
the computation of the adversary’s optimal strategy as a constrained optimization 
problem and approximate its solution based on dynamic programming. Subsequently, an 
optimal classifier is produced against the optimal adversarial strategy. Their experimental 
results demonstrate that their game-theoretic approach outperforms traditional classifiers 
in the spam filtering domain. However, in their adversarial classification framework, they 
assume both the classifier and the adversary have perfect knowledge of each other, which 
is unrealistic in practice. 
Instead of assuming the adversary has perfect knowledge of the classifier, Lowd 
and Meek formalize the task of adversarial learning as the process of reverse engineering 
the classifier [16]. In their Adversarial Classifier Reverse Engineering (ACRE) 
framework, the adversary aims to identify difficult spam instances—the ones that are 
7 hard to detect by the classifier—through membership queries. The goal is to find a set of 
negative instances with minimum adversarial cost within a polynomial number of 
membership queries.   
Newsome et al. [20] emphasize the point that training data used to build classifiers 
for spam filtering and the similar problem of internet worm detection is, to a large extent, 
controlled by an adversary. They describe and demonstrate several attacks on the 
generators of such classifiers in which the adversary is able to significantly impair the 
learning of accurate classifiers by manipulating the training data, even while still 
providing correct labels for the training instances. The attacks involve inserting features, 
in a specific manner, into one or both classes of the training data and are specifically 
designed to cause a significant increase in false positives or false negatives for the 
resulting classifier. They conclude that the generation of accurate classifiers for 
adversarial environments should take into account the fact that training data is controlled 
by an adversarial source. 
Barreno et al. [2] explore possible adversarial attacks on machine learning 
algorithms from multiple perspectives. They present a taxonomy of different types of 
attacks on machine learning systems. An attack is causative if it targets the training data, 
and is exploratory if it aims to discover information through, for example, offline 
analysis. An attack is targeted if it focuses on a small set of points, and is indiscriminate 
if it targets a general class of points. An integrity attack leads to false negatives, and an 
availability attack aims to cause (machine learning) system dysfunction by generating 
many false negatives and false positives. They also discuss several potential defenses 
8 against those attacks, and give a lower bound on the adversary’s effort in attacking a 
naïve learning algorithm. 
A practical example of adversarial learning is the technique known as the good 
word attack. Lowd and Meek [17] present and evaluate several variations of the good 
word attack. The attack can be carried out in one of two ways: actively or passively. The 
active version of the attack uses feedback from the targeted spam filter to determine 
which words are deemed good by the filter. Two methods are described for executing 
these attacks. First-N Words involves removing words from a spam email one at a time, 
appending the removed word to a ham email and submitting it to the filter for 
classification.  This process repeats until the previously-ham email is classified as spam. 
Dictionary words are then added to this “barely spam” email, one at a time and replacing 
the previously added word, until the email is classified as ham again. A word that causes 
the barely spam email to be classified as ham is added to a list. This process repeats until 
a list of n good words is obtained. Best-N Words, works like the former method but in 
addition to finding a list of good words, it also finds a list of bad words in a similar 
fashion. Each bad word is used to partition the list of good words into a set of words with 
smaller weight than the bad word and a set with greater weight. After completing the 
partitioning process with all of the bad words, the method halts with a list of the best n 
good words. The active attacks were found to be very effective, measured against current 
statistical spam filters. Moreover, the execution of such attacks can be quite costly to the 
spammer, since they require user-level access to the targeted spam filter as well as a large 
number of queries to the filter to build the lists.  
9 The other type of good word attack discussed in [17] is known as the passive good 
word attack. This attack does not require feedback from the spam filter and instead 
involves guessing which words the target spam filter may consider to be good. There are 
three common ways of passively choosing good words. Dictionary attacks involve 
selecting random words from a large collection of words, such as a dictionary. In testing, 
this method did not prove to be effective; in fact, it actually increased the chances that the 
email would be correctly classified as spam. Frequent word attacks involve the selection 
of words that occur most often in legitimate sources of content, such as news articles. 
This method was more effective than the dictionary attack, but it still required as many as 
1,000 words to be added to the original message. Finally, frequency ratio attacks involve 
the selection of words that occur very often in legitimate messages but very rarely in 
spam messages. Tests showed that this technique was quite effective, resulting in a 
typical spam message being passed off as legitimate by adding as few as 150 words.   
Webb, Chitti, and Pu [27] also examine the effectiveness of good word attacks on 
statistical spam filters.  They present a “large-scale evaluation” of the effectiveness of the 
attack on four spam filters: Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machine (SVM), LogitBoost, 
and SpamProbe.  Their experiments were performed on a large email corpus consisting of 
around a million spam and ham messages, which they formed by combining several 
public and private corpora. Such a large and diverse corpus more closely simulates the 
environment of a server-level spam filter than a client-level filter.  The experimental 
results show that, on normal email, i.e., email that has not been modified with good 
words, each of the filters is able to attain accuracy as high as 98%.  When testing on 
“camouflaged messages”, however, the accuracies of the filters drop to between 50% and 
10 75%.  In their experiments, spam emails were camouflaged by combining them with 
portions of legitimate messages.  They experimented with camouflaged messages 
containing twice as much spam content as legitimate content, and vice versa. They also 
proposed and demonstrated a possible solution to the attack. By training on a collection 
of emails consisting of half normal and half camouflaged messages, and treating all 
camouflaged messages as spam, they were able to improve the accuracy of the filters 
when classifying camouflaged messages.  
Our counterattack strategy against good word attacks is inspired by work in the 
field of multiple instance (MI) learning. The concept of MI learning was initially 
proposed by Dietterich et al. [9] for predicting drug activities. The challenge of 
identifying a drug molecule that binds strongly to a target protein is that a drug molecule 
can have multiple conformations, or shapes. A molecule is positive if at least one of its 
conformations binds tightly to the target, and negative if none of its conformations bind 
well to the target. The problem was tackled with an MI model that aims to learn axis-
parallel rectangles (APR). Later, learning APR in the multiple instance setting was 
further studied and proved to be NP-complete by several other researchers in the PAC-
learning framework [1], [15], [3]. 
Several probabilistic models: Diverse Density (DD) [18] and its variation EM-DD 
[34], and multiple instance logistic regression (MILR) [23], employ a maximum 
likelihood estimation to solve problems in the MI domain. The original DD algorithm 
searches for the target concept by finding an area in the feature space with maximum 
diverse density, that is, an area with a high density of positive points and a low density of 
negative points. The diverse density at a point in the feature space is defined to “measure 
11 probabilistically how many different positive bags have instances near that point, and 
how far the negative instances are from that point.” EM-DD combines EM with the DD 
algorithm to reduce the multiple instance learning problem to a single-instance setting. 
The algorithm uses EM to estimate the instance in each bag which is most likely to be the 
one responsible for the label of the bag. The MILR algorithm presented by Ray and 
Craven [23] is designed to learn linear models in a multiple instance setting. Logistic 
regression is used to model the posterior probability of the label of each instance in a bag, 
and the bag level posterior probability is estimated by using softmax to combine the 
posterior probabilities over the instances of the bag. Similar approaches with different 
combining functions are presented by Xu and Frank [30]. 
Many single-instance learning algorithms have been adapted to solve the multiple 
instance learning problem. For example, Wang and Zucker [26] propose the lazy MI 
learning algorithms, namely Bayesian-kNN and citation-kNN, which solve the multiple 
instance learning problem by using the Hausdorff distance to measure the distance 
between two bags of points in the feature space. Chevaleyre and Zucker [6] propose the 
multi-instance decision tree ID3-MI and decision rule learner RIPPER-MI by defining a 
new multiple instance entropy function and a multiple instance coverage function. Other 
algorithms that have been adapted to multiple instance learning include the neural 
network MI-NN [22], DD-SVM [5], MI-SVM and mi-SVM [1], multi-instance kernels 
[11], MI-Ensemble [35], and MI-Boosting [30]. 
12 CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Problem Formulation 
Consider a single instance supervised learning problem with a set of training data  
} , , , , , , , { 1 1 > < > < > < = m m i i Y X Y X Y X D K K , where   is an instance represented as a 
single feature vector and   is the target value of  , where C is the target 
binary classification function. Normally, the task is to learn Cgiven  . The learning task 
becomes more difficult when there are adversaries that may alter some instance    so 
that   and cause 
i X
) ( i i X C Y = i X
D
i X
′ → i i X X ′ → i i Y Y , where  ′ ≠ i i Y Y . Let  i X Δ  be the difference 
between and  , that is,  i X i X' i i i X X X Δ + = ' .  In the case of spam filtering, an adversary 
can modify spam emails by injecting them with good words. So,  i X Δ  represents a set of 
good words added to a spam message by the spammer.  There are two cases that need to 
be studied separately: 
1.  the filter is trained on normal emails, that is, emails that have not been injected 
with good words, and tested on emails which have been injected with good 
words; 
2.  both the training and testing sets contain emails injected with good words. 
In the first case, the classifier is trained on a clean training set. Predictions made for 
the altered test instances are highly unreliable. In the second case, the classifier may 
13 capture some adversarial patterns as long as the adversaries consistently follow a 
particular pattern.  
In both cases, the problem becomes trivial if we know exactly how the instances are 
altered; we could recover the original data and solve the problem as if no instances were 
altered by the adversary. In reality, knowing exactly how the instances are altered is 
impossible. Instead, we seek to approximately separate and  i X i X Δ and treat them as 
separate instances in a bag. We can then apply multiple instance learning to learn a 
hypothesis defined over a set of bags.  The next section introduces four techniques we 
have devised for splitting emails into bags of instances. 
3.2  Multiple Instance Bag Creation 
We propose four different approaches for creating multiple instance bags from 
emails. We call them split-half (split-H), split-term (split-T), split-projection (split-P), 
and split subtraction (split-S). We will now discuss each of these splitting methods, in 
turn. 
 
3.2.1  Split-H 
In our first splitting method, split-half (split-H), we split every email right down the 
middle into approximately equal halves. Formally, let  } ,..., ,..., { m i 1 B B B B =  be a set of 
bags (emails), where   is the   bag,   and   are the two instances in 
the   bag created from the upper half and the lower half of the email respectively. This 
splitting approach is reasonable in practice because spammers usually append a section of 
} , { i2 i1 i X X B =
th i i1 X i2 X
th i
14 good words to either the beginning or the end of an email to ensure the legibility of the 
spam message. As will be discussed later in Section 5.3, this splitting method, because it 
relies on the positions of words in an email, could potentially be circumvented by the 
spammer. The next three splitting methods do not rely on the positions of the words and 
thus do not suffer from that vulnerability.  
3.2.2  Split-T 
The second splitting method, split-term (split-T), partitions a message into three 
groups of words (terms) depending on whether the word is an indicator of spam, an 
indicator of ham, or neutral, i.e.,  } , , { ih in is i X X X B = , where   is the spam-likely 
instance,   is the neutral instance, and   is the ham-likely instance in bag  . The 
instance to which each word is assigned is based on a weight generated for it during 
preprocessing. These weights are calculated using word frequencies obtained from the 
spam and legitimate messages in the training corpus. More specifically, the weight of a 
term W is given as follows:  
is X
in X ih X i B
,
) | ( ) | (
) | (
) (
h s
s
D W p D W p
D W p
W weight
+
=  
where and are the spam and ham emails in the training set respectively. When 
splitting an email into instances we used two threshold values,   and  , to 
determine which instance (spam-likely, ham-likely, or neutral) each word in the email 
should be assigned to, given its weight. We considered any word with a weight greater 
than   to be spammy, any word with a weight less than   to be legitimate, 
and any word with a weight in between to be neutral. In our experiments, reasonable 
s D h D
s thresh l thresh
s thresh l thresh
15 threshold values were determined by using cross validation on training emails. Given 
each training set,   was selected such that some fraction of the terms chosen during 
attribute selection (discussed in Section 
s thresh
4.3) would have a weight less than or equal to it. 
 was selected so that some other fraction of the terms would have a weight greater 
than or equal to it.  The actual threshold values used in our experiments are given later in 
Section 
l thresh
4.5.   
3.2.3  Split-P 
The third splitting method, split-projection (split-P), transforms each message into a 
bag of two instances by projecting the message vector onto the spam and ham prototype 
vectors. The prototype vectors are computed using all the spam and ham messages in the 
training set. If we view the spam and ham messages in the training set as two clusters, 
then the prototypes are essentially the centroid of the two clusters. More specifically, let 
 be the set of emails that are spam and   be the set of emails that are legitimate. The 
prototypes are computed using Rocchio’s algorithm 
s C l C
[24] as follows: 
P
s=β⋅1/|C
s|⋅  ∑
i=1
|C
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s
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where   is the   spam message in   and   is the   ham message in  , 
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fixed constant suggested to be 16 and γ  is a fixed constant suggested to be 4. Given a 
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The rationale of this splitting approach rests on the assumption that a message is close to 
the spam prototype in terms of cosine similarity if it is indeed spam, and a ham message 
is close to the ham prototype. 
3.2.4  Split-S 
The last splitting method, split-subtraction (split-S), like the former, uses prototype 
(centroid) vectors. In this method, however, the ham and spam prototypes are calculated 
by averaging the corresponding attribute values of all of the ham and spam emails, 
respectively: 
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where   is a set of spam and   is the   spam message in  ;   is a set of ham, 
and   is the   ham message in  . A message can then be transformed from a single 
instance attribute vector M into a bag of two instances by subtracting corresponding 
attribute values in the single instance vector from the ham prototype and the spam 
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17 l l P M M s s P M M prototype, yielding a legitimate instance  − =  and a spam instance  − = , 
respectively [33]. 
Now that we have devised several techniques for creating multiple instance bags 
from email messages, we can transform the standard supervised learning problem of 
spam filtering into a multiple instance learning problem under the standard MI 
assumption. For this thesis, we adopt the multiple instance logistic regression (MILR) 
model to train a spam filter that is more robust to adversarial good word attacks than 
traditional spam filters based on single instance models. We chose to use the MILR 
classifier over other MI classifiers mainly because its single instance counter-part, 
logistic regression (LR), which has been shown to be very effective in the spam filtering 
domain [31], appeared to be the best among the single instance classifiers considered in 
our experiments. The next section outlines multiple instance logistic regression. 
3.3  Multiple Instance Logistic Regression 
Given a set of training bags  } , , , , { B > , , , 1 1 < > < > m m i i Y B Y B K Y B K ,  = <
let  be the probability that the i ) | 1 Pr( i i B Y =
th bag is positive, and   be the 
probability that it is negative. The bag-level binomial log-likelihood function is: 
) | 0 Pr( i i B Y =
∑
=
= − + = =
m
i
i i i i i i B Y Y B Y Y L
1
)] | 0 Pr( log ) 1 ( ) | 1 Pr( log [  
In a single instance setting where logistic regression is used, given an example , we 
model the expected value of the dichotomous outcome of   with a sigmoidal response 
function, i.e., 
i X
i X
)) exp( 1 /( ) exp( ) | 1 ( b X p b X p X Y Pr i i i i + ⋅ + + ⋅ = = , then estimate the 
18 parameters p and b that maximize the log-likelihood function. In a multiple instance 
setting, we do not have direct measure of bag-level probabilities in the log-likelihood 
function. However, since individual instances in the bags can also be considered as 
binary response data, we estimate the instance-level class probabilities  ) | 1 ( ij ij X Y Pr =  
with a sigmoidal response function as follows:  
 
,
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where   is the  instance in the   bag, and p and b are the parameters that need to be 
estimated. Thus   with instance-level class probabilities can be computed as 
follows:  
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Now we can compute the probability that a bag is negative as: 
) | 0 ( i i B Y Pr = =   ) | 0 (
1
ij ij
n
j
X Y Pr = ∏
=
     = )))) exp( 1 (log( exp(
1
b X p ij
n
j
+ ⋅ + −∑
=
 
where n is the number of instances in the   bag. Note that this probability estimate 
encodes the multiple instance assumption, i.e., a bag is negative if and only if every 
instance in the bag is negative, and thus the probability estimate  
th i
) | 0 ( 1 ) | 1 ( i i i i B Y Pr B Y Pr = − = =  
encodes that a bag is positive if at least one instance in the bag is positive. In our case, 
given a set of emails for training,   is a vector of the frequency count (or other  ij X
19 variations such as a tf-idf weight) of unique terms in each email. We can apply maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) to maximize the bag-level log-likelihood function, and 
estimate the parameters p and b that maximize the probability of observing the bags in B. 
3.4  Research Questions 
This thesis is primarily concerned with answering the following research questions: 
Q1:  Does using the proposed multiple instance learning strategy to classify email reduce 
the effectiveness of an adversarial good word attack on a statistical spam filter 
trained on normal, i.e., unaltered, email? 
Q2:  Does using the proposed multiple instance learning strategy to classify email reduce 
the effectiveness of an adversarial good word attack on a statistical spam filter 
trained on modified, i.e., attacked, email? 
Q3:  Is the effectiveness of the proposed strategy dependent on the specific technique 
used to split emails into multiple instance bags? 
3.5  Research Hypotheses 
In this thesis, we verify the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Using the proposed multiple instance learning strategy to classify email will reduce 
the effectiveness of an adversarial good word attack on a statistical spam filter 
trained on normal email. 
H2:  Using the proposed multiple instance learning strategy to classify email will reduce 
the effectiveness of an adversarial good word attack on a statistical spam filter, when 
training on email modified with good words. 
H3: The effectiveness of the proposed strategy is heavily dependent on the specific 
technique used to split emails into multiple instance bags. 
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EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
 
We evaluated our multiple instance learning counterattack strategy on emails from 
the 2006 TREC Public Spam Corpus [7]. Good word attacks were simulated by 
generating a list of good words from the corpus and injecting them into spam messages in 
the training and/or test data sets. We compared our counterattack strategy, using the 
multiple instance logistic regression model and the four splitting methods introduced 
earlier, to its single instance learning counterpart—logistic regression (LR)—and to the 
support vector machine (SVM) and the multinomial naïve Bayes (MNB) classifiers. 
These single instance classifiers are among those most commonly employed in existing 
statistical spam filters. 
4.1  Evaluation Metrics 
One important characteristic of spam filtering is that incorrectly classifying a 
legitimate email is far more costly to the user than incorrectly classifying a spam email.  
If a spam message makes its way into a user’s inbox, it can be annoying; but if an 
important legitimate message is accidentally misclassified as spam and the user never 
gets it, there can be serious consequences. On the other hand, having a spam filter that 
never misclassifies a legitimate message but misses large amounts of spam defeats the 
21 purpose of having the filter in the first place. This asymmetrical misclassification cost 
must be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of spam filters.  
Throughout the rest of this thesis, we will refer to several evaluation metrics when 
speaking about the effectiveness of a given spam filter.  Precision is defined as the 
fraction of messages correctly classified as spam.  A high precision indicates that few 
legitimate messages are misclassified as spam, i.e., false positives. Recall is the fraction 
of spam messages (out of all the spam messages encountered by the filter) that were 
identified by the filter as spam.  A high recall indicates that few spam emails are 
misclassified, i.e., false negatives.  Ideally, spam filters should have both high precision 
and high recall, but as a practical matter, high precision has a greater priority.  F-measure 
is the weighted harmonic mean of precision and recall and allows us to compare spam 
filters based on a single value.   Formulas for the calculation of these three metrics are 
given below: 
TP FN
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Precision
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Recall Precision
Recall Precision
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where TP  is the number of true positives,   is the number of false positives, and   
is the number of false negatives.   
FP FN
In addition to these three measures, we also present some of our experimental 
results in the form of Receiver Operating Characteristics, or ROC, graphs. ROC graphs 
are two-dimensional graphs with true positive rate on the Y axis and false positive rate on 
22 the X axis. These graphs show the tradeoffs between true positives and false positives 
and are commonly used to visualize the performance of statistical classifiers [10].  In 
general, one classifier performs better than another if it produces a ROC curve that is to 
the northwest of the curve produced by the other on the graph. The total area under a 
ROC curve (AUC) is also commonly used as a metric to compare classifiers. The AUC of 
a spam classifier can be interpreted as the probability that the classifier will rate a 
randomly chosen spam email as spammier than a randomly chosen legitimate email. Thus 
a classifier with a higher AUC generally performs better than one with a lower AUC.  
4.2  Experimental Data 
Our experimental data consists of 36,674 spam and legitimate email messages from 
the 2006 TREC Public Spam Corpus. All of the emails in the corpus come in their raw 
form, with headers, html and other features fully intact.  As such, they must be put 
through a preprocessing stage to reduce them to a form that is suitable for use by the 
spam filters. Therefore, we preprocessed the entire corpus using the following standard 
preprocessing techniques: 
•  Partial stripping of email headers—the to, from, cc, subject, and received headers 
were retained, while the remaining headers were discarded. 
•  Stripping of HTML tags—HTML tags, when present, were fully stripped from 
each email message. 
•  Discarding of attachments—email attachments, when present, were discarded. 
•  Stemming of all words—the stemming process essentially strips the suffix from 
each word, e.g., the words “mail”, “mailer”, and “mailing” would all be reduced 
to “mail”.  This is done to reduce the number of terms considered by the filter to 
a manageable number and greatly improves the time and space efficiency of the 
23 filtering process. We chose to use the popular Porter Stemming Algorithm [21] 
for the stemming process. 
•  Removing stop words—stop words are words that are extremely frequent in the 
English language. Our list of stop words contains a little over 300 words.  We 
can safely remove these words because they are so common that they generally 
appear in spam messages just as often as they do in legitimate messages.  Again, 
we do this to reduce the number of terms that the filter must consider.  
Messages that contained an empty body after preprocessing were discarded. 
Tokenization was done by splitting on nonalphanumeric characters. We did not take any 
measures to counter obfuscated words in the spam messages, as that is out of the scope of 
this thesis. Given that there are a large number of possible ways to disguise a word, most 
content-based spam filters are not able to deobfuscate the text of a message efficiently 
[4]. Recently, an efficient complementary filter [14] has been demonstrated to be able to 
effectively deobfuscate text with high accuracy. In practice, this type of technique could 
be used during preprocessing.  Figure 1 shows a sample spam email message before and 
after preprocessing.   
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a) email before preprocessing 
 
b) email after preprocessing 
 
Figure 1 Preprocessing Example 
 
25 For our experiments we sorted the emails in the corpus chronologically by receiving 
date and evenly divided them into 11 subsets { }. In other words, the messages 
in subset n were received chronologically before the messages in subset n+1. 
Experiments were run in an on-line fashion, i.e., we trained on subset n and tested on 
subset n+1. Each subset contains approximately 3300 messages. The percentage of spam 
messages in each subset varies as in the operational setting (see Figure 2). We used the 
Multiple Instance Learning Tool Kit (MILK) 
11 1,...,D D
[29] implementation of MILR and the 
Weka 3.4.7 [28] implementations of LR, SVM and multinomial naїve Bayes, in our 
experiments. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Percentage of emails in each data set that are spam. 
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4.3  Feature Selection and Weighting 
We reduced the feature space used to describe the emails in our experiments to the 
top 500 features ranked using information gain. Feature selection is necessary for reasons 
of efficiency and for avoiding the curse of dimensionality. It is also common practice in 
the spam filtering domain. In our experiments, retaining 500 features appeared to be the 
best compromise among the classifiers in terms of improved efficiency and impaired 
performance. Figure 3 shows how the performance of the classifiers varies as the number 
of retained features increases. Attribute values for each message were calculated using 
the well-known tf-idf (term frequency-inverse document frequency) weighting scheme.  
Under this weighting scheme, attributes are assigned a weight that corresponds to their 
importance to the email message in the corpus that contains them. The tf-idf weight for a 
given term in a given email is calculated as follows. Let  be the number of occurrences 
of the given term in the given email−the term frequency. We normalize by dividing it 
by the maximum value of for the given term over all emails in the corpus.  Let tf be the 
normalized value of .  The inverse document frequency, idf , is 
f
f
f
f ⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎝
⎛
b
a
2 log where   is 
total number of emails in the corpus and b is the number of emails in the corpus that 
contain the given term.  Then the weight for the given term is
a
idf tf w × = .  Note that tf-
idf weighting is widely used in information retrieval and text mining, and has been shown 
to be able to greatly improve the performance of multinomial naïve Bayes in several text 
categorization tasks [12]. 
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Figure 3 Effect of number of retained features on f-measure. 
4.4  Good Word List Creation 
The good word list used in our simulated good word attacks was generated in two 
different ways: 1) a global good word list was generated using all 36,674 messages in the 
2006 Trec corpus, 2) and a local good word list was generated using messages in the 
current training set. When generating the global good word list, we ranked every unique 
word in the corpus according to the ratio of its frequency in the legitimate messages over 
its frequency in the spam messages. We then selected the top 1,000 words from the 
ranking to use as our good word list. Generating the good word list in this manner has an 
important implication. Since the list was generated from the entire corpus rather than 
28 from the subset of messages used to train the classifiers, and since we represent emails 
using a feature vector of 500 features, some of the words in the list will not have an effect 
on the classification of messages that they are injected into. Such a list is more 
representative of the kind of list a spammer would be able to produce in practice, since 
the spammer would have no way of knowing the exact features used by the target filter. 
We noticed, in our experiments, that only about 10% of the injected good words were 
actually retained in the feature vector, yet, as you will see, they had a significant impact 
on the classification. Nevertheless, we also tested the extreme case in which we assumed 
the adversary has perfect knowledge of the training set and the selected features. We 
created a local good word list from messages in each training set and kept only the words 
that are in the selected feature vector. 
4.5  Threshold Values for Split-Term 
The two threshold values,   and  , must be determined for the splitting 
method split-term. As mentioned earlier, for each training set,   was selected such 
that some fraction of the terms chosen would have a weight greater than or equal to it. 
 was selected so that some other fraction of the terms would have a weight less 
than or equal to it. For each of the ten training sets, we selected, using 5-fold cross 
validation, the best threshold values that divided the terms into three categories—spam, 
ham, and neutral. The selected thresholds were used for testing on the test set. 
s thresh l thresh
s thresh
l thresh
Table 1 
lists the percentages of the terms divided by the thresholds selected for each training set. 
 
29 Table 1 Percentages of the terms divided by the split-T threshold. 
 
Subset #  s thresh   l thresh  
1 20%  50% 
2 20%  50% 
3 30%  50% 
4 10%  50% 
5 20%  50% 
6 20%  50% 
7 10%  50% 
8 10%  50% 
9 30%  50% 
10 30%  50% 
 
30 CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
We now present the results of two experiments in which we evaluate the 
effectiveness of our proposed multiple instance counterattack strategy. In the first 
experiment, we train all of the classifiers on normal email (i.e., email that has not been 
injected with good words) and then test them on email that has been injected with good 
words. In the second experiment we train on both normal and attacked emails to observe 
how doing so affects classification of both normal and attacked emails. 
5.1  Experiment 1: Attacking the Test Set 
In this experiment, we tested the ability of the MILR algorithm, using the four 
splitting methods introduced earlier, to classify email injected with good words. We also 
tested the single instance logistic regression (LR), support vector machine (SVM) and 
multinomial naïve Bayes (MNB) classifiers for comparison. The classifiers were each 
trained and tested on the eleven chronologically sorted data sets in an on-line fashion. 
That is, all of the classifiers were trained on the same unaltered data set  , and then 
tested on the data set  , for n=1...10. Fifteen variations of each test set were created to 
test the susceptibility of the classifiers to good word attacks of varying strength. The first 
version of each test set was left unmodified, i.e., no good words were injected. Half of the 
n D
1 + n D
31 spam messages (selected at random) in each of the remaining 14 variations of each test 
set were injected with some quantity of random good words from our global good word 
list, beginning with 10 words. With each successive version of the test set, the quantity of 
good words injected into half of the spam messages was increased: first in increments of 
10 words, up to 50, and then in increments of 50 words up to 500. The injected words 
were randomly selected, without replacement, from our global good word list on a 
message by message basis. We chose to inject good words into only half of the messages 
in each test set because, in practice, spam messages injected with good words account for 
only a subset of the spam emails encountered by a given filter. The precision of each 
classifier was fixed at 0.9 and the corresponding recall on each version of the test set for 
all 10 test sets was averaged and recorded for each classifier. In our results, we use 
“MILRH”, “MILRT”, “MILRP” and “MILRS” where split-H, split-T, split-P and split-S 
were used with MILR, respectively.   
Figure 4 shows how the average recall of each classifier is affected as the good 
word attack increases in strength (that is, the quantity of good words injected into the 
spam emails increases).  Figure 5 and Table 2 show the ROC curves and corresponding 
AUC values respectively, for each classifier as the good words are injected. Each ROC 
graph contains six curves, each corresponding to a specific quantity of good words. We 
chose not to include curves for all quantities of good words in order to keep the graphs 
readable. To make comparison easier, Figure 6 shows two ROC graphs containing the 
ROC curves of all the classifiers when 0 words and 500 words are added to the test set 
respectively. In our results, each ROC curve shown is an average of the curves resulting 
32 from the ten subsets. The curves were averaged using the vertical averaging algorithm 
given by Fawcett [10]. 
 
 
Figure 4 Change in average recall as quantity of injected good words increases. 
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a) MILRH 
 
b) LR 
 
Figure 5 Average ROC curves for specific quantities of good words injected. 
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c) MILRT 
 
d) MNB 
 
Figure 5 Continued. 
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e) MILRP 
 
f) SVM 
 
Figure 5 Continued. 
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g) MILRS 
 
Figure 5 Continued. 
 
Table 2 Change in AUC as the quantity of injected good words is increased. 
 
Words  MILRT  MILRH  MILRS  MILRP  LR  MNB  SVM 
0  0.946 0.966 0.962 0.957 0.981  0.976 0.979 
10  0.945 0.962 0.944 0.934 0.968  0.935 0.961 
20  0.943 0.956 0.928 0.914 0.958  0.898 0.946 
30  0.941  0.953  0.917 0.901 0.948 0.871 0.933 
40  0.941  0.949  0.903 0.888 0.939 0.842 0.921 
50  0.940  0.943  0.889 0.875 0.928 0.816 0.910 
100  0.937  0.919 0.838 0.831 0.883 0.730 0.855 
150  0.935  0.893 0.804 0.800 0.845 0.684 0.810 
200  0.935  0.868 0.775 0.774 0.813 0.656 0.774 
250  0.934  0.844 0.749 0.756 0.785 0.642 0.745 
300  0.934  0.825 0.730 0.741 0.764 0.631 0.725 
350  0.933  0.803 0.712 0.726 0.742 0.622 0.702 
400  0.933  0.786 0.699 0.714 0.727 0.617 0.689 
450  0.933  0.775 0.688 0.710 0.712 0.614 0.675 
500  0.933  0.762 0.681 0.702 0.702 0.611 0.664 
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a) 0 good words injected 
 
b) 500 good words injected 
 
Figure 6 ROC curves for 0 words (a) and 500 good words (b) injected. 
 
38 From the results we can see that, with the exception of MILRT, the good word 
attack significantly affected the ability of each classifier to identify spam emails. MILRT 
was the most resilient of all the classifiers to the attack, dropping by only 3.7% (from 
0.963 to 0.927) in average recall after 500 good words had been added to the spam 
messages. MILRH and MILRP stood up better to the attack than the single instance 
classifiers and the MILRS classifier, but the attack still had a very noticeable effect on 
their ability to classify spam, reducing the average recall of MILRH by 30.8% (from 
0.972 to 0.673) and the average recall of MILRP by 35.3% (from 0.938 to 0.607). Of the 
single instance classifiers, LR was the most resilient; however, the attack still had a very 
significant effect on its ability to classify spam, reducing its average recall by 42.5% 
(from 0.986 to 0.567). The average recall of MNB and SVM dropped by 49.2% (from 
0.984 to 0.500) and 46% (from 0.984 to 0.531) respectively. MILRS turned out to be 
nearly as vulnerable to the attack as the single instance classifiers, dropping by 42% 
(from 0.974 to 0.565) in average recall.  We feel that these results provide conditional 
support for hypothesis 1, which stated that the proposed strategy would reduce the effect 
of the good word attack on a filter trained on unmodified email. Although some of the 
splitting techniques provided a good defense against the good word attack, not all of them 
did so.  In fact, as observed previously, split-S was nearly as susceptible to the attack as 
the single instance classifiers.   
One thing that is clear from these results is that the effectiveness of our multiple 
instance counterattack strategy is very much dependent on the specific technique used to 
split emails into multiple instance bags. This observation clearly supports our third 
hypothesis which stated that the effectiveness of the proposed strategy would be highly 
39 dependent on the specific technique used to split the emails. The success of the split-term 
method is due to the fact that the classifier is able to consider both spammy and 
legitimate terms independently, since they are placed into separate instances in the bag 
created from an email. Under the multiple instance assumption, if at least one instance in 
a bag is spammy, the entire bag is labeled as spammy. When good words are injected into 
a spam message they end up in the legitimate instance of the bag and have no effect on 
the spammy instance; thus the bag still contains a spammy instance and is classified 
correctly as spam. We verified this by running the experiment again on the following 
classifier configurations: MILR with no splitting (single instance bags), MILRT with the 
neutral and hammy instances discarded from each bag, and LR with spammy terms only 
(all legitimate terms were excluded from the feature vector). We found that using MILR 
without any of the splitting methods (all bags contained a single instance), caused it to 
behave almost identically to the way LR behaved in experiment 1. We also found that 
discarding the neutral and hammy instances from the MILRT bags resulted in a classifier 
that was unaffected by the good word attack, but was only able to attain a maximum 
recall of 0.757 and a maximum precision of 0.906. Training LR on spammy terms only 
produced very similar results; it was unaffected by the good word attack, but only 
attained a maximum recall of 0.723 and a maximum precision of 0.931. 
To test the extreme case, in which an adversary has perfect knowledge of the 
training set and the selected features, we repeated the experiment using a local good word 
list for each training set. The words in each of the local good word lists were generated 
from the respective training set and were limited to only those good words that were in 
the selected feature vector for the training set. For each corresponding test set, the entire 
40 contents of the local good word list were added to all of the spam messages in the set. 
Figure 7 shows the result of this attack on each of the classifiers in terms of precision and 
recall. MILR, with every splitting method, was more resilient to the attack than any of the 
single instance classifiers. MILRT again was most resilient to the attack. However, the 
effect of the attack was severe enough for all of the classifiers to consider them defeated 
for practical purposes. Although it is not realistic to assume that the adversary could 
obtain perfect knowledge of the target filter in practice, these results serve to illustrate the 
amount of damage a good word attack could potentially inflict on these classifiers in the 
extreme cases. 
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a) Average precision of each classifier 
 
b) Average recall of each classifier 
 
Figure 7 Average precision (a) and recall (b) when injecting local good word list. 
5.2  Experiment 2: Training on Attacked Spam Messages 
In the second experiment, our goal was to observe the effect that training on 
messages injected with good words has on the susceptibility of the classifiers to attacks 
42 on the test set. As in the previous experiment, we tested each of the classifiers on the 
eleven chronologically sorted data sets in an on-line fashion. This time, however, in 
addition to creating 15 versions of the test set injected with increasing quantities of good 
words, we also created 5 versions of the training set. We injected 10 good words into half 
of the spam messages (selected at random) in the first version of the training set and then 
increased the number of injected good words by 10 for each subsequent version, up to 50 
good words for the fifth version. We also tried injecting larger numbers of good words, 
but after exceeding 50 words, the additional effect was minimal; therefore, those results 
are not presented. For each version of the training set we tested the classifiers on the 15 
versions of the corresponding test set. As before, good words were selected from our 
global good word list randomly and without replacement on a message by message basis. 
For all ten tests, the precision of each classifier was fixed at 0.9 and the corresponding 
recall values on each version of the test set were averaged and recorded, separately for 
each of the 5 versions of the training set.  Figures 8-12 show the change in average recall 
as the number of good words injected into the training set increased from 10 to 50.  
Figure 13 shows two graphs containing the ROC curves of all the classifiers when 0 good 
words and 500 good words are added to the test set respectively and 10 good words are 
added to the training set.  Figure 14 shows the same curves after 50 good words have 
been added to the training set. 
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Figure 8 Change in average recall with 10 good words injected into the training set. 
 
Injecting just 10 good words into half of the spam messages in the training set 
appeared to lessen the effect of the good word attack for almost all of the classifiers. In 
particular, the average recall of LR with 500 good words injected into half of the spam 
messages in the test set was 32.1% higher after 10 good words had been injected into the 
training set compared to when no good words had been injected into the training set 
(comparing Figures 4 and 8). Likewise, the average recall values of MNB, SVM, 
MILRH, MILRP and MILRS were 32.6% higher, 29.4% higher, 10.1% higher, 26.9% 
higher and 25.8% higher respectively. The average recall for MILRT was actually 5.5% 
lower even though it was still the best among all the classifiers. 
44  
 
Figure 9 Change in average recall with 20 good words injected into the training set. 
 
Increasing the number of good words injected into the training set from 10 to 20 
(see Figure 9) continued to lessen the effect of the attack for all of the classifiers. After 30 
good words had been injected into the training set, the presence of good words in the test 
messages actually began to increase the likelihood that such messages would be correctly 
classified as spam (See Figures 10, 11 and 12). These results support our second 
hypothesis, which stated that our proposed strategy would reduce the effect of the good 
word attack on a filter that had been trained on both unmodified and attacked messages. 
These results also confirm the observations of several other researchers [17], [27], that 
retraining on normal and attacked emails may help to counter the effects of the good 
word attack. However, it is important to realize that this would only work in cases where 
the attacked messages being classified contained the same good words as the attacked 
45 messages that the spam filter was trained on. One of the major advantages of our 
proposed multiple instance strategy is that the spam filter need not be trained on attacked 
messages in order to be effective against attacks and further, that frequent retraining on 
attacked messages is not necessary for the strategy to maintain its effectiveness. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 Change in average recall with 30 good words injected into the training set. 
 
To test the extreme case, in which an adversary has perfect knowledge of the 
training set and the selected features, we repeated the experiment using local good word 
lists for each training set. The words in each of the local good word lists were generated 
from the respective training set and were limited to only those good words that were in 
the selected feature vector for the training set. The entire contents of the local good word 
list were added to all of the spam messages in the corresponding training and test sets. 
46 Figure 15 shows the result of this attack on each of the classifiers in terms of precision 
and recall. Notice that for every classifier, with the exception of multinomial naïve 
Bayes, the effects of the attack on the training set were completely countered by adding 
the same words to the spam messages in the training set; however, we should again point 
out that these results are possible only because the good words added to the spam 
messages in the training and test sets were the same. In practice, there is no such  
guarantee. 
 
 
 
Figure 11  Change in average recall with 40 good words injected into the training 
set. 
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Figure 12 Change in average recall with 50 good words injected into the training set.
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a) 0 good words injected into the test set; 10 injected into the training set 
 
b) 500 good words injected into the test set; 10 injected into the training set 
 
Figure 13 Injecting 10 good words into training set and 0 (a) and 500 (b) into test 
set. 
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a) 0 good words injected into the test set; 50 injected into the training set 
 
b) 500 good words injected into the test set; 50 injected into the training set 
 
Figure 14 Injecting 50 good words into training set and 0 (a) and 500 (b) into test 
set. 
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a) Average precision of each classifier 
 
b) Average recall of each classifier 
 
Figure 15 Attacking training and test sets with entire contents of local good word list.
 
51 5.3  Potential Attacks on the Splitting Methods 
In this section we investigate possible attacks on the splitting methods we have 
proposed. We recognized two possible ways for a spammer to attack a spam filter 
equipped with splitting methods like split-H. Both of the attacks work because split-H 
relies on how the words are physically positioned in an email to split it into multiple 
instances. One way to attack it is to create a visual pattern with good words so that the 
original spam message is still legible after the attack, but the spam is fragmented in such 
a way that spammy words are well separated. If this is done correctly, when the attacked 
message is split, good words should outweigh spammy words in both instances. The 
example in Table 3 illustrates the idea. 
 
Table 3 Attacking split-H by fragmenting spam with injected good words. 
 
From: foo@internet.org 
To: foo-foo@email.org 
Subject: meeting agenda 
good words    ...        low          ...     good words 
good words    ...    mortgage    ...     good words 
good words    ...       rate          ...     good words 
 
 
We tested this attack by running MILRH (MILR with split-H) on the 11 data sets, 
with the test set at each iteration attacked with 500 good words in the following manner. 
50% of the spam messages in each test set were selected at random to be attacked by 
inserting 3 random good words before and after every 6 words in the message. No more 
52 and no less than 500 words were inserted into any message, regardless of the length of 
the message. That is, in the case of short messages, after 3 good words were inserted 
before and after every 6 words of the message, words were added to the end of the 
message until a total of 500 words had been added. For long messages, once 500 words 
were added, the process was stopped. The good words were selected, without 
replacement, from the same global good word list used in the other experiments.  
Figure 16 compares the effects of adding 500 good words to the messages in the 
manner just described to the effects of adding 500 good words by appending them to the 
end of the messages (as in experiment 1), in terms of the recall averaged over the ten tests 
(corresponding to a fixed precision of 0.9). As the figure shows, attacking the messages 
in the manner described here drastically decreases the effectiveness of split-H, reducing 
the average recall of MILRH by 24.8% to 0.506 (compared to that of MILRH in 
experiment 1 with 500 good words added to the test set, which was 0.673). This attack 
had the same effect on the other splitting methods as did the attack in experiment 1 
(Section  ) since the physical position of the words in the attacked messages has no 
influence on how they are split with those methods; thus, those results are not shown 
here.  
5.1
A second way to defeat the split-H method is to append a very large block of good 
words to the spam messages, so that after the split, good words would still outweigh 
spammy words in both instances in the bag. In fact, we believe this is exactly what 
happened in experiment 1. Observe in Figure 4 that the average recall of MILRH did not 
really begin to drop significantly until after 50 good words had been injected into the 
spam messages in the test set. As even more good words were injected into the spam 
53 messages, the average recall continued to drop as the longer messages began to 
accumulate enough good words to outweigh the spammy words in both instances. In 
practice, depending on the length of the spam message, coming up with a large enough 
block of good words might prove difficult. 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Comparing effects of the split-H attack and the experiment 1 style attack. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this thesis, a multiple instance learning counterattack strategy for combating 
adversarial good word attacks on statistical spam filters has been proposed. In the 
proposed strategy, emails are treated as multiple instance bags and a logistic model at the 
instance level is learned indirectly by maximizing the bag-level binomial log-likelihood 
function.  
The proposed counterattack strategy has been demonstrated on simulated good 
word attacks of varying strength in order to test three primary hypotheses. The results of 
our first experiment provided conditional support for our first hypothesis, which stated 
that the use of the proposed strategy would reduce the effects of the good word attack on 
a spam filter trained on unmodified email. In the results of that experiment, we saw that 
the proposed strategy provided a strong defence against the attack when used with some 
but not all of the instance transformers. These results also clearly supported our third 
hypothesis, which stated that the effectiveness of the proposed strategy would be highly 
dependent on which instance transformer was used to split the emails into multiple 
instance bags. 
Support for our second hypothesis, which stated that the use of the proposed 
strategy would reduce the effects of the good word attack on a spam filter trained on both 
55 unmodified and attacked email, was provided by the results of our second experiment. In 
those results, we saw that including attacked messages in the training set increased the 
ability of each filter to identify attacked messages in the test set. Additionally, these 
results confirmed earlier reports that retraining on attacked as well as normal emails may 
strengthen a spam filter against good word attacks.  
One of the advantages of the proposed strategy, as demonstrated through the 
experiments, is that it is effective even when trained on normal email and that frequent 
retraining on attacked messages is not necessary to maintain that effectiveness.  
Several possible methods for creating multiple instance bags from emails have been 
devised and presented in this thesis. As was observed from the experimental results, the 
splitting method used ultimately determines how well the strategy performs. The splitting 
methods presented here work fairly well, especially the split-term method, but there are 
possibly other, perhaps better, methods that could be used. Further investigation into 
other possible splitting methods is left as future work.  
Since it is an arms race between spammers and filter designers, the proposed MI 
strategy should eventually be made adaptive to handle new spam techniques as they are 
devised and on-line as the concept of spam drifts over time. In addition, the possibility of 
extending the proposed multiple instance learning strategy to handle similar adversarial 
attacks in other domains could be investigated.
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APPENDIX: Samples of Good Word Attack 
  
The figures below are actual attacked spam messages received by a real email 
account.  The spam and good word portions of the messages have been marked for 
illustrative purposes. 
 
 
Figure 17 An actual attacked spam email 
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Figure 18 Another attacked spam email 
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